I’ve seen quite a few written research briefs in my time.

And most of them, from a researcher’s point of view, have been hard work. Too much information, not enough information, odd information, wrong information, etc.

This used to really bug me. Why, I’d wonder, tearing my hair out, couldn’t clients learn to write good research briefs?

And then, one day, it clicked. Humble pie, etc. It’s not really cricket to ask, or expect them to. A clients’ job is to use the research, not to have to design it too. Ahem. That’s my job.

While a beautifully written brief might make our lives, as researchers, easier, it won’t necessarily make the research any better. In fact, more often than not, the most useful information for developing a research programme comes from sitting down for a chat with a client. Talking through the issues invariably helps both parties shape and focus their thinking well beyond a written brief.

Are two minds always better than one? I don’t think so.

Take a six group qualitative research project. Two moderators are assigned to the project, each running three groups. Timings, diary clashes, etc, mean that they won’t get to attend many (if any) of each other’s groups.

When the groups are finished, the two moderators get together to discuss their three groups worth of insight. They then stitch the findings together, in a perfectly gestalt fashion, to deliver >six groups worth of insight.

Not!

It doesn’t work that way. The insight from three groups, even if you multiply it by two, is still just insight from three groups.

What’s missing, is the incremental learning: each moderator has only three – not six – sessions in which to evolve and refine their hypotheses. Effectively, you end up with three groups worth of insight, but the client is paying for six.

*Raises one eyebrow*

The only way two minds can be better than one in this scenario is if both moderators watch all of each other’s groups, or just one moderator conducts all the groups.

Just saying.

I wrote the following paper when I was studying psychology at UNSW. Our assignment was to choose one or two articles to critique, and I chose two about the cognitive theory of emotion.

I recently retrieved it from the archives after a post on Adam Ferrier’s blog (worth a visit) triggered my memory of it. Dusted it off, reformatted it and voila! 

Be warned; unless you have a specific interest in cognitive psychology, it’ll probably bore you to tears. I’m just posting it on the back of my last post, because it’s one of my favourites. : P

If you’ve got any from the archives – pre-blog days – and want to share, please do!

———————————————————————

Anxiety & depression: An information processing perspective

This paper offers a critique of Beck and Clark’s (1988) proposal ‘that each psychological disorder has a specific cognitive profile evident at all levels of cognitive functioning’. Specifically, it will consider whether adequate definitions are given with regard to the fundamental concepts proposed in their theory. It will consider the evidence used to substantiate such concepts, the way in which depression and anxiety are measured, and the relevance of the theory in a clinical context.

Conscious versus unconscious processing

Beck and Clark propose a cognitive theory of anxiety and depression based on the fundamental assumption ‘that cognitive processes mediate emotional and behavioural responses’. Implicit in this assumption is that cognitive processes are conscious processes that are ‘accessible to awareness’. The way in which unconsciously processed information might affect measures of anxiety and depression is not considered. In disregarding the probable involvement of unconscious processes in information processing, it could be argued that the theory is inadequate in its delineation of cognition.

However, down playing the role that unconscious processes may play in psychopathology is justifiable within the context of Beck and Clark’s argument. When the theory is applied to a clinical context, their rationale is clear. By limiting cognitive processes to the domain of conscious awareness, Beck and Clark have contrived a manifest point for therapeutic intervention. Maladaptive thoughts need to be accessible to awareness to be modified. This is the basis of cognitive therapy.

Cognitive profiles

Beck and Clark argue that anxiety and depression have specific cognitive profiles. However, in proposing a theory that has presumably developed closely to, or in analogy with, observations made in a clinical setting, it is notable that Beck and Clark do not differentiate amongst the depressive disorders with regard to these profiles. A distinction is only made on the basis of the intensity of depression, for example, whether a patient is clinically, mildly or non-clinically depressed. No distinction is made with regard to the type of depression, for example, between bipolar, unipolar, cyclothymic or dysthymic disorders. Thus the degree to which these different depressions share or do not share the same cognitive profile is not made clear.

Albeit for the anxiety disorders some distinction is made between panic, agoraphobia, generalised anxiety disorder and social anxiety, no information is given with regard to the way in which the cognitive profiles may differ from one to the other. Both theoretically and clinically, such differentiation would be of interest.

Another issue deserving considerably more attention than is given is that of psychopathological comorbidity. What would a cognitive profile of an individual who suffers both anxiety and depression look like?

Cognitive structure and propositions

For Beck and Clark the notion of schemas is synonymous with cognitive structures and propositions. Their hypothesis regarding the presence of negative self schemas in depression is corroborated by the literature. Beck and Clark cite studies where clinically and mildly depressed people rated more negative and fewer positive words as self descriptive than controls, and studies where depressed patients endorsed more negative world and future relevant trait adjectives than anxious and non-depressed, non-anxious psychiatric controls. They also cite research that suggests that the accessibility to unpleasant memories is related to the severity of depression in clinical patients.

However, for anxiety, Beck and Clark concede that no firm conclusions can be made with regard to a specific cognitive profile at the schema level. While preliminary research appears to support the notion that schemas involving physical or psychological threat are activated in anxiety states, more research is clearly needed in this area.

Cognitive operations

At the level of cognitive operations, it is postulated that the components of the information processing system interact, and here, Beck and Clark’s argument stands on firmer ground. The notion of an association between depression and enhanced processing of self-relevant negative information, and an association between anxiety and selectively perceiving threat and danger and interpreting ambiguous stimuli as threatening, has empirical support.

Cognitive outputs

Beck and Clark propose that cognitive products, such as voluntary cognitions and automatic thoughts play a crucial role in maintaining psychopathology at the output level. Several studies are cited to support this claim. However, Clark (1988) observes that some individuals report that they are not aware of having such voluntary cognitions or automatic thoughts. What is the evidence that such cognitions or thoughts are indeed the antecedents of emotional responses? Theorists have been contending the question of whether cognitions precede emotion or whether emotion precedes cognitions for years. Beck and Clark skillfully sidestep this issue however, proposing equivocally that cognitive processes mediate emotional and behavioural responses.

Thus questions regarding the aetiology of anxiety and depression remain unanswered by Beck and Clark. Theirs is more a post hoc analysis of anxiety and depression. They are not concerned with what causes the differences in the proposed cognitive profiles apart from mentioning, in passing, the contribution of ‘genetic, biological, environmental and developmental factors’. No explanations are given for why it may be that some individuals process information in a negative way and others interpret stimuli as threatening. The vexed question regarding the aetiology of anxiety and depression thus remains in the province of academia.
On a more pragmatic level, the cognitive theory of anxiety and depression advanced by Beck and Clark has had an enormous and positive impact in the clinical field. Its merit as a framework for devising effective therapeutic techniques has been sustained by independent studies that demonstrate its efficacy in treating both depressed and anxious individuals.

Summary

Beck and Clark provide fairly adequate definitions with regard to the fundamental concepts proposed in their theory, albeit these definitions are theory dependent. The evidence used to substantiate such concepts is generally well grounded in empirical research. More emphasis could be given in differentiating between the cognitive profiles associated with various kinds of depression and anxiety, and in exploring the notion of comorbidity and its implications for the cognitive profile of each disorder. Aetiological hypotheses of anxiety and depression lie beyond the scope of Beck and Clark’s theory. However, their proposed cognitive theory of anxiety and depression has pragmatic merit as a framework for the techniques of the cognitive therapies. It is in a clinical context that the strength of the theory lies.

This critique was based on the following articles:

Beck, A. T., & Clark, D. A. (1988) Anxiety and depression: An information processing perspective. Anxiety Research, Vol. 1, 23 – 36.

Clark D. M. (1988) A Cognitive Model of Panic Attacks. In S. Rachman & J. D Maser (eds). Panic: Psychological Perspectives (p.71 – 89), Hillsdale, N. J. Erlbaum.

I think I’ve become accustomed.

I’m talking about corporates tweeting as corporates; not individuals tweeting for corporates. Wildly different rules and expectations.

My case in point is Virgin Atlantic (Australia), who made a (brief it now seems?) appearance on Twitter recently.

Anyway, they were tweeting exclusive Twitter flights deals and my reaction surprised me. Didn’t bat an eyelid. Hence this post.

When I first experienced “the corporate follow”, I felt a little wary. Here they were, in my personal corner of cyberspace, talking at me in a formal, corporate way. And because my Twitter experience, until that point, had been very much about interacting with my Twitterverse on a personal level, the corporate tone really jarred with me. It seemed so very out of place.

But things change very quickly in social media; Australian corporates on Twitter are now a dime a dozen. And my expectations of, and tolerance for, corporate tweeting has evolved.

Even though Virgin Atlantic weren’t talking with me (more like at me), as I originally would have demanded hoped of a corporate in the Twitter space, I didn’t mind at all. Actually, I was more than happy that they didn’t want to engage with me. Saw value in their tweet-deals, etc.

Interesting.

P.S  I still don’t ‘get’ Ubank on Twitter.  

This post is to say thank you to those – listed below – who sent in questions for my MarketingMag series on qualitative research. The input was invaluable.

And I highly recommend taking a look at their websites/blogs – some excellent reading.

That’s all. Post over. What are you still doing here? Go clicking!

Stephen Collins: Acidlabs

Gavin Costello: Franksting.com

Kate Curruthers: Aide-mémoire

Gavin Heaton: Servant of Chaos

Mark Jones: Filtered Media

Belinda Leskiw: Classy Marketing’s Blog

Leah Maclean: Working Solo

Carlee Potter: SNOBS

Duncan Riely: Blogging is not a spectator sport

Kate Tribe: Know Your Tribe

Louise Veyret: Blog That!

Gordon Whitehead: The Marketer

(And a big thank you to Scott Drummond for all his help!).

P.S If you didn’t get a chance to ask a question about qualitative research, but would like to, click here to send one in.

I’ve been watching, waiting and above all, wondering about the shape of qualitative research during/post the digital rush.

I have 3 questions: all intrinsically linked, but each consuming in its own right:

1. How does qualitative data, captured through online channels, compare to data captured through more ‘traditional’ methods such as focus groups, in-depth interviews, etc?
2. Is online qualitative research more cost efficient than offline research?
3. Will new digital feedback forums mean the end for live focus groups?

A post on each of these coming soon.